Investment Thesis — the long form
The full house case per bank: what the franchise earns, where earnings go, what the price already assumes, and what would change the answer.
The thesis
Why this stock works, or does not.
the largest, cheapest-to-run bank in India is priced at 1.6x core book — a decade low, below Axis — because of a leadership question, not a franchise problem. Normalised-capital ROE is already ~16%; reported ROE will follow as ₹73/sh of surplus capital is levered and 100 bp-expensive e-HDFC liabilities roll off.
Earnings trajectory
Where the profit comes from, year by year.
FY26–31E PAT CAGR 16%; FY27E is the last year of single-digit growth (+9%) as NIM troughs; FY28–31E EPS compounds 17–18% on NIM +30 bp, cost/income to 34% and 15% loan growth. Our FY28E EPS (62.4) is 4–5% below the street. Sustainable ROE 16% (ROA 1.9–2.0% × 8.3x normalised leverage) vs COE 12.75% — the 50 bp governance premium is the only reason the COE is not 12.25%.
Sustainable ROE versus cost of equity
The number the whole valuation rests on.
Valuation
How the target is built, and the bull/bear span.
capital-adjusted RIM fair P/B 1.87x on Mar-26 book; TP ₹918 (core ₹794 + subsidiaries ₹124), +29%. Bear ₹602 (−15%), bull ₹1,163 (+64%). Market-implied ROE 15.5% with 9% growth. Catalyst / risk: the MD/CEO decision (term ends 26-Oct-2026). Continuity or a credible internal successor removes the overhang; an external hire with senior attrition is the bear case. Second risk: NIM stuck at 3.3% if FCNR(B) money is deployed into thin corporate spreads.
Catalyst and risk
What moves it, and what breaks it.
the MD/CEO decision (term ends 26-Oct-2026). Continuity or a credible internal successor removes the overhang; an external hire with senior attrition is the bear case. Second risk: NIM stuck at 3.3% if FCNR(B) money is deployed into thin corporate spreads.
Driver model — FY22 actual through FY31E
The house forecast. Blue-shaded years are estimates in the source workbook.
| ₹ crore unless stated | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | FY27E | FY28E | FY29E | FY30E | FY31E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net advances | 13,68,821 | 16,00,586 | 24,84,862 | 26,19,609 | 29,37,166 | 33,48,369 | 38,50,625 | 44,28,218 | 50,48,169 | 57,29,672 |
| Loan growth % | 20.80 | 16.90 | 55.20 | 5.40 | 12.10 | 14.00 | 15.00 | 15.00 | 14.00 | 13.50 |
| Deposits | 15,59,217 | 18,83,395 | 23,79,786 | 27,14,715 | 31,05,250 | 35,71,037 | 41,42,403 | 48,05,188 | 55,25,966 | 62,99,602 |
| Deposit growth % | 16.80 | 20.80 | 26.40 | 14.10 | 14.40 | 15.00 | 16.00 | 16.00 | 15.00 | 14.00 |
| NII | 72,009 | 86,843 | 1,08,533 | 1,22,670 | 1,28,686 | 1,39,024 | 1,62,516 | 1,90,368 | 2,20,304 | 2,53,289 |
| NIM %* | 4.00 | 4.10 | 3.60 | 3.65 | 3.45 | 3.30 | 3.42 | 3.52 | 3.58 | 3.62 |
| Other income | 29,510 | 31,215 | 49,241 | 45,632 | 62,533 | 60,184 | 67,362 | 76,071 | 86,558 | 98,419 |
| Opex | 37,442 | 47,652 | 63,386 | 68,200 | 72,660 | 78,473 | 86,320 | 95,815 | 1,06,355 | 1,18,054 |
| PPOP | 64,077 | 70,406 | 94,388 | 1,00,102 | 1,18,559 | 1,20,735 | 1,43,558 | 1,70,624 | 2,00,507 | 2,33,654 |
| Provisions | 15,062 | 11,920 | 23,492 | 11,600 | 23,390 | 14,142 | 17,997 | 22,767 | 26,060 | 29,639 |
| PAT | 36,961 | 44,109 | 60,812 | 67,347 | 74,671 | 81,544 | 96,054 | 1,13,111 | 1,33,452 | 1,56,071 |
| Cost/income % | 36.90 | 40.40 | 40.20 | 40.50 | 38.00 | 39.40 | 37.60 | 36.00 | 34.70 | 33.60 |
| Credit cost % | 1.20 | 0.80 | 1.15 | 0.45 | 0.84 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| GNPA % | 1.17 | 1.12 | 1.24 | 1.33 | 1.15 | — | — | — | — | — |
| ROA % | 1.94 | 1.95 | 2.00 | 1.79 | 1.80 | 1.76 | 1.84 | 1.90 | 1.97 | 2.03 |
| ROE % | 16.70 | 17.00 | 16.90 | 14.30 | 14.00 | 13.70 | 14.50 | 15.20 | 15.90 | 16.40 |
| CET1 % | 17.00 | 16.40 | 16.30 | 17.20 | 17.50 | 17.30 | 17.00 | 16.60 | 16.50 | 16.40 |
PAT and PPOP
₹ crore
ROA and ROE
%
NIM and credit cost
%
Where the sell-side sits
Verified broker targets held in the library.
| Broker | Rating | TP | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ambit | BUY | 1050 | ~2.1x FY28E standalone BVPS |
The challenge to this thesis
Narain's critique, applied to every name in the group.
- ▸ FCNR(B) changes the sector's RISK, not its return
The briefing treats the FCNR window as the funding bottleneck breaking — an unambiguous positive.
- ▸ 19% loan growth is not being rewarded, and the market is right
The briefing reads 19% system credit growth as a structural volume story at 1–1.5x nominal GDP.
- ▸ Mean reversion is the weakest part of the bull case
The briefing anchors fair values on banks sitting in the lower half of their own historical P/B band.
Read the chapter thesis with this beside it. The note's fair values sit 12–40% above spot and rest partly on multiples returning toward their own history; Narain's view is that those means have permanently reset. Full critique →