Tijori
2026-09-08 15:08
Buoyant
2026-09-07 (model valuation date)
41 lenders598 syncs ok2 failed

Investment Thesis — the long form

The full house case per bank: what the franchise earns, where earnings go, what the price already assumes, and what would change the answer.

Source: Buoyant Capital, “India's Big Four Private Banks: Franchise, Returns and the Price of Perfection” — coverage initiation, 7 September 2026, 55 pages, internal. Valuation date 7-Sep-2026, NSE closes, standalone financials. Everything on this page is transcribed from that note, not re-derived. State Bank of India is not covered by it — that note is the four private banks only — so SBI is shown from the peer table and the sell-side, and labelled as such.
Rating
—
BUY
CMP
711
Target price
918
Upside
29.0%
FY28E EPS
—
₹ per share
FY31E PAT
156071
₹ crore

The thesis

Why this stock works, or does not.

the largest, cheapest-to-run bank in India is priced at 1.6x core book — a decade low, below Axis — because of a leadership question, not a franchise problem. Normalised-capital ROE is already ~16%; reported ROE will follow as ₹73/sh of surplus capital is levered and 100 bp-expensive e-HDFC liabilities roll off.

Earnings trajectory

Where the profit comes from, year by year.

FY26–31E PAT CAGR 16%; FY27E is the last year of single-digit growth (+9%) as NIM troughs; FY28–31E EPS compounds 17–18% on NIM +30 bp, cost/income to 34% and 15% loan growth. Our FY28E EPS (62.4) is 4–5% below the street. Sustainable ROE 16% (ROA 1.9–2.0% × 8.3x normalised leverage) vs COE 12.75% — the 50 bp governance premium is the only reason the COE is not 12.25%.

Sustainable ROE versus cost of equity

The number the whole valuation rests on.

Valuation

How the target is built, and the bull/bear span.

capital-adjusted RIM fair P/B 1.87x on Mar-26 book; TP ₹918 (core ₹794 + subsidiaries ₹124), +29%. Bear ₹602 (−15%), bull ₹1,163 (+64%). Market-implied ROE 15.5% with 9% growth. Catalyst / risk: the MD/CEO decision (term ends 26-Oct-2026). Continuity or a credible internal successor removes the overhang; an external hire with senior attrition is the bear case. Second risk: NIM stuck at 3.3% if FCNR(B) money is deployed into thin corporate spreads.

Catalyst and risk

What moves it, and what breaks it.

the MD/CEO decision (term ends 26-Oct-2026). Continuity or a credible internal successor removes the overhang; an external hire with senior attrition is the bear case. Second risk: NIM stuck at 3.3% if FCNR(B) money is deployed into thin corporate spreads.

Driver model — FY22 actual through FY31E

The house forecast. Blue-shaded years are estimates in the source workbook.

₹ crore unless statedFY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27EFY28EFY29EFY30EFY31E
Net advances13,68,82116,00,58624,84,86226,19,60929,37,16633,48,36938,50,62544,28,21850,48,16957,29,672
Loan growth %20.8016.9055.205.4012.1014.0015.0015.0014.0013.50
Deposits15,59,21718,83,39523,79,78627,14,71531,05,25035,71,03741,42,40348,05,18855,25,96662,99,602
Deposit growth %16.8020.8026.4014.1014.4015.0016.0016.0015.0014.00
NII72,00986,8431,08,5331,22,6701,28,6861,39,0241,62,5161,90,3682,20,3042,53,289
NIM %*4.004.103.603.653.453.303.423.523.583.62
Other income29,51031,21549,24145,63262,53360,18467,36276,07186,55898,419
Opex37,44247,65263,38668,20072,66078,47386,32095,8151,06,3551,18,054
PPOP64,07770,40694,3881,00,1021,18,5591,20,7351,43,5581,70,6242,00,5072,33,654
Provisions15,06211,92023,49211,60023,39014,14217,99722,76726,06029,639
PAT36,96144,10960,81267,34774,67181,54496,0541,13,1111,33,4521,56,071
Cost/income %36.9040.4040.2040.5038.0039.4037.6036.0034.7033.60
Credit cost %1.200.801.150.450.840.450.500.550.550.55
GNPA %1.171.121.241.331.15—————
ROA %1.941.952.001.791.801.761.841.901.972.03
ROE %16.7017.0016.9014.3014.0013.7014.5015.2015.9016.40
CET1 %17.0016.4016.3017.2017.5017.3017.0016.6016.5016.40

PAT and PPOP

₹ crore

ROA and ROE

%

NIM and credit cost

%

Where the sell-side sits

Verified broker targets held in the library.

BrokerRatingTPBasis
AmbitBUY1050~2.1x FY28E standalone BVPS

The challenge to this thesis

Narain's critique, applied to every name in the group.

  • ▸ FCNR(B) changes the sector's RISK, not its return

    The briefing treats the FCNR window as the funding bottleneck breaking — an unambiguous positive.

  • ▸ 19% loan growth is not being rewarded, and the market is right

    The briefing reads 19% system credit growth as a structural volume story at 1–1.5x nominal GDP.

  • ▸ Mean reversion is the weakest part of the bull case

    The briefing anchors fair values on banks sitting in the lower half of their own historical P/B band.

Read the chapter thesis with this beside it. The note's fair values sit 12–40% above spot and rest partly on multiples returning toward their own history; Narain's view is that those means have permanently reset. Full critique →